Issue #12. May 2001
SORITES, ISSN 1135-1349
Issue #12. May 2001. Pp. 3-5.
Abstracts of the Papers
Copyright © by SORITES and the authors
Abstracts of the Papers
From Paracosistent Logic to Universal Logic
by Jean-Yves Béziau
For several years I have been developing a general theory of logics that I have called Universal Logic. In this article I will try to describe how I was led to this theory and how I have progressively conceived it, starting my researches about ten years ago in Paris in paraconsistent logic and the broadening my horizons, pursuing my researches in Brazil, Poland and the USA.
God and His/her Act of Creation: Leibniz and the «Why-not-sooner» Argument
by Abel B. Franco Rubio de la Torre
The question about how to conceive God's act of creation in a fashion compatible with Leibniz's own thought is in itself a cluster of complex and interrelated issues. I will discuss only three aspects (or conglomerates of aspects) of the issue: (1) Leibniz's view of how God actually created the world, and within this and more specifically, (2) his arguments to reject the «why-did-God-not-create-the-world-sooner» question as not applicable to this case, and (3) the consequences of those arguments for the concept of time. I will argue that, given Leibniz's own view of creation and time, (1) the question about why God did not create the world earlier or later is a legitimate one despite his explicit efforts in the opposite sense, and, furthermore, (2) an answer to the question within Leibniz's thought would fall prey of fatal contradictions and inconsistencies.
Impossibility of Two-valued Logic to Be Universally Valid
by Ardeshir Metha
If two-valued logic is assumed to be universally valid, it leads to a paradox, for a proof can thereby be found that it is impossible for two-valued logic to be universally valid. This consequence results in some very significant philosophical implications for the physical sciences and mathematics, especially since they are both based exclusively on two-valued logic.
Meaning, Normativity and Reductive Naturalism
by Deborah C. Smith
In «The Normativity of Meaning», Eric Gampel argues that the capacity to justify a linguistic usage is essential to meaning and suggests that this fact entails that naturalistic theories of meaning must take a non-reductive form if they are to be viable. I will argue that reductive and non-reductive naturalisms stand or fall together in the face of Gampel's argument that meaning plays an essential justificatory role. I will further argue that, if they fall, the lesson to be learned is not that we should avoid reductionism, but rather, that we should steer clear of physicalism in our meaning theory; if Gampel's argument is cogent, any theory of meaning will have to make reference to at least some abstract objects.
Frankfurt on Personal Failure
by Alan White
Over the years there have appeared a number of theoretical and metatheoretical broadsides against Harry Frankfurt's familiar arguments denying that a free moral agent have alternatives in some real sense as a necessary condition for her moral responsibility. In what follows I will attempt to focus on a particular defensive strategy of Frankfurt's, which, when analyzed, yields evidence that such attacks, particularly the metatheoretical ones, are not misplaced.
Dispositionalism and Meaning Skepticism
by Silvio Pinto
In a recent thought-provoking paper on skepticism concerning meaning (1997), Scott Soames claims that Kripke's and Quine's arguments that there are no facts about meanings are flawed for similar reasons. According to Soames, both of them are based on a confusion about how a certain kind of fact determines another (for instance, what it takes for a dispositional fact to determine a particular linguistic meaning). Soames' strategy to refute the skeptical arguments advanced by Kripke and Quine involves distinguishing two notions of determination both of which, if applied unambiguously and consistently throughout the formulation of the above skeptical reasonings, would fall short of licensing the far-reaching and devastating skeptical conclusions that their proponents intended them to have. This paper is an attempt to vindicate the problem raised by the meaning skeptic, and to show that Soames' suggested dispositional account cannot even partially solve it.