SORITES ISSN 1135-1349
Issue #08. June 1997. Pp. 3-4.

Abstracts of the Papers

Copyright © by SORITES and the authors

Abstracts of the Papers

Synthesising Intersubjectively
S.H. Elkatip

The question discussed is whether Quine abolishes the analytic synthetic distinction or changes its nature. It is argued that either the point is trivial and the former is not established or the latter holds: Quine challenges the teaching that analytical statements are exchanged intersubjectively whereas some synthetic statements are private.

Truth in Pure Semantics: A Reply to Putnam

Luis Fernández Moreno

In his book Representation and Reality Hilary Putnam raises a number of objections against the semantical conception of truth. According to Putnam two particularly undesirable consequences of the semantical conception of truth are that the equivalences of the form (T) are logically necessary and that the truth of a sentence does not depend on its meaning. In this paper I examine these two objections of Putnam with respect to Carnap's formulation of the semantical conception of truth.

Argumentation, values, and ethics

Alfonso Monsalve

Moral concepts are argumentative values with claims to universal acceptance. they exprees beliefs that are formed in dialogical exchange. The paper defines conditions of acceptability of this kind of beliefs and its limitations.

  • Framework of an Intersubjetivist Theory of Meaning

    Cristina Corredor

    • Here a critical revision is carried out of the intersubjectivist theory of meaning embodied in the Formal (Universal) Pragmatics developed within the framework of the Theory of Communicative Action (J. Habermas). According to very recent «internal» criticisms, only a version of H. Putnam's theory of direct reference can avoid the kind of meaning holism and linguistic relativism which assails Habermas' foundation of shared meaning on the intersubjective validity of a rule. A more detailed analysis of Putnam's views, as well as of the referred criticisms, shows that they in fact represent an unorthodox reading trying to conciliate Putnam's first functionalist theory with his second pragmatical Internal Realism. Finally it is concluded that only a quasi-Kantian view on the formal-pragmatical presuppositions underlying epistemic language use seems to offer an answer to the core de iure question: what makes it possible to justify validity for already constitued meanings in epistemic contexts.