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Abstracts of the Papers
The question discussed is whether Quine abolishes the analytic synthetic distinction or changes its nature. It is argued that either the point is trivial and the former is not established or the latter holds: Quine challenges the teaching that analytical statements are exchanged intersubjectively whereas some synthetic statements are private.
Luis Fernández Moreno
In his book Representation and Reality Hilary Putnam raises a number of objections against the semantical conception of truth. According to Putnam two particularly undesirable consequences of the semantical conception of truth are that the equivalences of the form (T) are logically necessary and that the truth of a sentence does not depend on its meaning. In this paper I examine these two objections of Putnam with respect to Carnap's formulation of the semantical conception of truth.
Moral concepts are argumentative values with claims to universal acceptance. they exprees beliefs that are formed in dialogical exchange. The paper defines conditions of acceptability of this kind of beliefs and its limitations.