C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1929). All subsequent references to this work will be labeled `MWO'. All reverences to his other major work -- An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1946) -- will be labeled `AKV'. All of my Lewis material comes from these two sources.
2. 1_2.
Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), p. 25.
3. 1_3.
Most commentators on Lewis have serious reservations about his strong foundationalism. For a recent example, see Susan Haack, «Foundationalism Undermined,» Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995).
4. 1_4.
`Cognitivism' is the view that all mental phenomena fundamentally involve thinking, which itself requires the manipulation of internal symbolic representations. For a nice introduction to the debate between cognitivists and their opponents, see Speaking Minds: Interviews with Twenty Eminent Cognitive Scientists, Peter Baumgartner and Sabine Payr (Eds.) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
5. 1_5.
For instance, see Timothy van Gelder, «What might cognition be if not computation?» Journal of Philosophy, 92 (7) (1995): 345-381.
6. 1_6.
`Situated action' names a research program [especially in artificial life] that views agents as closely coupled with their environment. This arrangement minimizes [if not eliminates] the role of representation [explicit, symbolic, or otherwise] in the production of behavior. For a proponent's view, see Rodney Brooks, «Intelligence Without Representation,» Artificial Intelligence, 47 (1991): 139-159; cf. David Kirsh, «Today the Earwig, Tomorrow Man?» Artificial Intelligence, 47 (1991): 161-184.
7. 1_7.
For an antirepresentationalist gloss on connectionism, especially on parallel distributed processing [PDP], see my «Representations, explanations, and PDP: Is representation-talk really necessary?» Informatica, 19 (4) (1995): 599-613.
8. 1_8.
For more on the general nature of the controversy, see my «Representations,» in William Bechtel and George Graham (Eds.), A companion to cognitive science (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, forthcoming). For an antirepresentational defense of computation, see my «Representations, explanations, and PDP: Is representation-talk really necessary?» Informatica, 19 (4) (1995): 599-613.; also see «Computation matters: An analog view of vision,» Proceedings of the 18th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (1996): 851. For a brief response to Andy Clark and Chris Thronton's defense of representationalism, see my «Why computation need not be traded only for internal representation,» Behavioral and Brain Sciences (in press).
9. 1_9.
Lewis fails to give any examples of possible modes of action formulated in expressive language. Frankly, I don't see how it is possible. I'll return to this point a bit later.
10. 1_10.
«If there is to be any knowledge at all, some knowledge must be a priori» (MWO, p. 196). For instance, consider the empirical statement `This penny is round', for example: «[W]hat is implicit in the concept [`penny'] sets the criteria by which further experience will verify (or falsify) the present judgement.» Such criteria are a priori; as such, they «are incapable of being overturned by the eventualities of experience» (MWO, p. 284).
11. 1_11.
«[A]ll empirical knowledge is vested, ultimately, in the awareness of what is given and the prediction of certain passages of further experience as something which will be given or could be given. It is such predictions of possible direct experience which we have called terminating judgments; and the central importance of these for all empirical knowledge will be obvious» (AKV, p. 202).
12. 1_12.
Still, our private concepts aren't entirely idiosyncratic: «[O]ur categories are almost as much a social product as is language. ... The `human mind' is a coincidence of individual minds which partly, no doubt, must be native, but partly is itself created by the social process» (MWO, p. 21; also see p. 25).
13. 1_13.
What I have in mind here are his commitments to foundationalism, the given [or sense-data], and intentional entities. Such commitments aren't held in very high regard today.
14. 1_14.
This qualification is crucial. I shall return to it in a moment.
15. 1_15.
For a similar passage, see AKV, pp. 172-174.
16. 1_16.
«There is such a thing as direct appreciation of the given, and such immediate apprehension of the quality of what is presented must figure in all empirical cognition» (MWO, p. 402). «[T]here is such a thing as experience, the content of which we do not invent and cannot have as we will but merely find» (AKV, p. 182).
17. 1_17.
I am indebted to Robert Barrett and the anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions.
18. 2_1.
Indeed we have suggested that one way to maintain a form of realism in the quantum context is to take this vagueness seriously (French, Krause and Maidens forthcoming).
19. 2_2.
It should be recalled that it is consistent with the formalism of quantum mechanics to treat elementary particles as `individuals' subjected to certain restrictions in their possible states (French and Redhead 1988).
20. 2_3.
Wang has also noted that in Cantor's writings there are implicit axioms for sets, such as those concerning extensionality, power-set, sub-sets and others, which were not explicated by Cantor since, according to Wang, they were `too obvious' (see Wang 1991).
21. 2_4.
As did Paul Teller in his 1995.
22. 2_5.
This is of course another source of philosophical controversy, but let us regard an `individual' as an entity for which there exists a reasonable theory of identity which applies to it, and this is the case with the elements of a quaset, as we have remarked.
23. 2_6.
We will make reference to the quasi-set theory presented in Krause forthcoming.
24. 2_7.
And also with other restrictiosn such as spatio-temporal location.
25. 3_1.
The other two deal, respectively, with individuation in the earler and later middle ages.
26. 3_2.
Individuality; An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics, (State University of New York Press: Albany, 1988).
27. 3_3.
Individuation and Indentity in Early Modern Philosophy; Descartes to Kant, ed. Kenneth Barber and Jorge J.E. Gracia, (State University of New York Press; Albany, 1994), p. 1.
28. 3_4.
Ibidem, pp. 4-5.
29. 3_5.
Ibidem, p. 5.
30. 3_6.
Ibidem.
31. 3_7.
«Religious Belief without Evidence,» in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Louis Pojman, (Wadsworth Publishing: Belmont, 1994), pp. 491-492.
32. 3_8.
Ibidem
33. 3_9.
I&I, pp. 14-15.
34. 3_10.
Ibidem.
35. 3_11.
Gracia, Individuality, pp. 144-150.
36. 3_12.
Cf. Suarez on Individuation; Metaphyscal Disputation V, trans. by Jorge Gracia, (Marquette University Press: Milwaukee, 1982), I, 7, p. 34.
37. 3_13.
Ibidem, II, 8, p. 45.
38. 3_14.
Ibidem, II, 16, p. 52.
39. 3_15.
See Metaphysical Disputations, VII, sect. 2.
40. 3_16.
Principles of Philosophy, I, 60.
41. 3_17.
I&I, pp. 16-17.
42. 3_18.
Ibidem, pp. 22, 25.
43. 3_19.
Ibidem, pp. 23-24.
44. 3_20.
Ibidem, p. 28.
45. 3_21.
Ibidem, pp. 28-29.
46. 3_22.
The so called natural theology, which included knowledge of the immortality of the soul, was used by 17th century scholastics, both Protestant and Catholic, to underpin the need for revelation and to combat atheism and public immorality. Thus the Lutheran Chemnitz wrote: «The reasons why God imparted the natural knowledge of Himself to the minds of all men are: (1) For the sake of external discipline, which Gopd wished to be exercised by all men, even the unregenerate; (2) That God might be sought after...; (3) That He might render men inexcusable.» (Quoted by Schmid, The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. by Charles Hay and Henry Jacobs, (Augusbrug: Minneapolis, 1961), p. 110). Those who denied divine providence or the immortality of the soul were typically styled «Epicurs» by 16th and early 17th century thinkers. This was, no doubt, due to the great popularity of Cicero's De deorum natura among the Renaissance humanists and Protestant scholastics (particularly the Lutherans, to whom Melanchthon bequethed his love of the ancient Roman). Later the favorite term of abuse for those who denied divine providence or immortality was «Spinozist» (See Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, pp. 352-360).
47. 3_23.
Another example of Regis' boldness is his assertion that on the Cartesian system body and soul form only an accidental unity. This seems more in harmonly with Descartes' own principles than Descartes' insistence that body and soul, though distinct substances, come together to form one substance. On the disagreement between Regis and Descartes see Descartes: Philosophical Letters, trans. by Anthony Kenny, (University of Minniesota Press: Minneaplois, 1970), Letter to Regis, Jan. 1642, pp. 126-130.
48. 3_24.
I&I, p. 56.
49. 3_25.
Ibidem, pp. 60-61.
50. 3_26.
Ibidem, p. 73.
51. 3_27.
Ibidem, pp. 79-82.
52. 3_28.
Ibidem, pp. 82-87.
53. 3_29.
Ibidem, p. 88.
54. 3_30.
Ibidem, p. 89.
55. 3_31.
Ethics, I, prop. XV, note.
56. 3_32.
I&I, p. 103.
57. 3_33.
Ibidem.
58. 3_34.
Ibidem, p. 104.
59. 3_35.
On this shift see Gracia, «Epilogue: Individuation in Scholasticism,» in Individuation in Scholasticism in the Later Middle Ages and Counter Reformation, ed. Gracia, (SUNY Press: Albany 1994).
60. 3_36.
Schiebler is unambiguous on this point: «Whatever exists (est in re) is singular.» He goes on to argue that it is logically necessary that every existent be singular: «Whatever exists has a certain and determinate entity. But every such entity necessarily has jointed to it the negation of division. Therefore, it has singular and individual being. The minor is clear since no being, that is no determinate entity, can be divided from itself. Therefore, no entity can be divided into many which are of the same sort as itself. Oherwise, the whole entity would be in each one as in the other and consequently it would be divided from itself...which is manifestly contradictory (repugnantiam).» Opus metaphysicum, Book I, cap. VI.
61. 3_37.
Cf. Opus metaphysicum, book I, cap. VIII.
62. 3_38.
Ibidem, book I, cap. XXII, Article 2, 2.
63. 3_39.
I&I, p. 109.
64. 3_40.
On this see Gracia, Individuality, pp. 150-155.
65. 3_41.
On the prevalence of this view in later Scholasticism see Ignancio Angelelli, «The Scholastic Background of Modern Philosophy,» in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and Counter-Reformation, pp. 535-540.
66. 3_42.
I&I, pp. 105-107.
67. 3_43.
Ibidem, pp. 112-114.
68. 3_44.
Cf. Suarez on Individuation, sect. VI. Bolton is wrong to think that Scheibler locates the individuation of all entities in matter cum form. This is true of material substances, but not of spiritual substances or of accidents. For Schiebler, as for Suarez, everything is individuated by its entity (Opus metaphysicum, Book I, cap. VI, art. 1-6). Scheibler even follows Suarez in holding that accidents are individuated by their own accidental entity, not by the subjects they inhere in (as the Thomist tradition holds).
69. 3_45.
I&I, p. 105.
70. 3_46.
Ibidem, pp. 114-115.
71. 3_47.
Ibidem, pp. 114-116.
72. 3_48.
Ibidem, p. 115.
73. 3_49.
Ibidem, p. 116.
74. 3_50.
Ibidem, p. 120.
75. 3_51.
Ibidem, pp. 121-122.
76. 3_52.
Ibidem, p. 120.
77. 3_53.
Ibidem, pp. 135-136.
78. 3_54.
Ibidem, pp. 134,137.
79. 3_55.
Ibidem, pp. 135-136.
80. 3_56.
Ibidem, p. 135.
81. 3_57.
Ibidem, p. 135.
82. 3_58.
Ibidem, pp. 138-140.
83. 3_59.
Ibidem, p. 149.
84. 3_60.
Ibidem, pp. 145-146.
85. 3_61.
Ibidem, pp. 148-146.
86. 3_62.
Ibidem, p. 150.
87. 3_63.
Ibidem, pp. 158-159.
88. 3_64.
Ibidem, pp. 159-160.
89. 3_65.
Ibidem, pp. 180-181.
90. 3_66.
Ibidem, pp. 184-185.
91. 3_67.
Wilson tries to square Hume's use of the category of «habit» with his epistemology by interpreting habits as patterns of ideas caused by convention. For a different view of the matter see R.P. Wolff, «Hume's Theory of Mental Activity,» in Hume; A collection of Critical Essays, ed. by V.C. Chappell (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, London, 1968) pp. 99-128.
92. 3_68.
On this see Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, (Harvard Universiy Press: Cambridge, 1969), pp. 5-12.
93. 3_69.
See the above mentioned article of Angelelli.
94. 3_70.
These include his own notion of individuality, the idea that all real beings are either substances or accidents, that God is pure act and creatures are a mixture of act and potency, that evil is not a positive reality but a privation, etc. Among the 17th century Protestant scholastics whom Leibniz refers to in the Theodicy are Calixtus, Calov, Chemnitz, Grotius, Keckerman, Museaus, Pufendorf, Gerhard and Sherzer.
95. 3_71.
Cf. Discourse on Metaphysics, X-XI.
96. 3_72.
I&I, pp. 202-204.
97. 3_73.
For a detailed discussion of Leibniz's nominalism see Benson Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1986), chap. X.
98. 3_74.
I&I, pp. 205-206.
99. 3_75.
Ibidem, pp. 211-212.
100. 3_76.
This is the way he spoke, in his correspondence with Arnauld, of the complete concepts of the various possible Adams God might have created.
101. 3_77.
Discourse on Metaphysics, IX, trans. by George R. Montgomery, (Open Court: LaSalle, 1980).
102. 3_78.
Cf. Mates. pp. 50,210.
103. 3_79.
Monodology, p. 42.
104. 3_80.
This squares with Leibniz's assertion that a perfect or a priori definition shows the possibility of a thing through its «generation or cause.» Of course, this would seem to make any a priori definition of God impossible, since He has no cause. But the scholastics felt that a quasi definition of God could be given showing how His attributes all follow from his very essence as actus purus. And this is the case even though in God Himself essence and attributes are identical: «We understand, however, by the «Divine Essence» that which is first conceived in God, through which God is adequately distinguished from all other things, and which, according to our mode of conceiving, is the root and principle of all the other perfections of God which are attributed to Him as properties.» (J.G. Baier, Compendium theologiae positivae, (1685) Pars Prima, c. I, «De Deo,» 5, a). A similar maneuver on the part of Suarez and other metaphysicians of the period allowed them to make metaphysics an Aristotelian science, even though its object, Being, is not really distinct from its «passions.»
105. 3_81.
This is shown in the order of 19th century scholastic treatises which follow the general Wolffian order of the disciplines, beginning with Ontology, proceeding to Cosmology, then Rational Psychology and ending with Rational Theology. As Maritain never tired of pointing out, this order of the disciplines is not that which St. Thomas espoused in his Commentary on the De trinitate of Boethius).
106. 3_82.
I&I, pp.230-236.
107. 3_83.
Ibidem, p. 227.
108. 3_84.
Ibidem, p. 231.
109. 3_85.
Ibidem, pp.231-234.
110. 3_86.
Ibdem, pp. 232-234.
111. 3_87.
See Leibniz's letter to Arnauld dated April 30, 1687 (pp. 180-199 in Montgomery).
112. 3_88.
Monodology
113. 3_89.
Monodology
114. 3_90.
Wolf, Philosophia prima sive ontologia, ed. by Joannes Ecole, (Georg Olms Hidesheim: Amsterdam, 1962), Part II, sect. II, cap. I, # 686.
115. 3_91.
Ibidem.
116. 3_92.
Ibidem, # 721-22.
117. 3_93.
Aquinas, De ente et essentia, II,9.
118. 3_94.
Wolf, Ontologia, Pars I, sect. II, cap. III, # 169.
119. 3_95.
On this see Leibniz's letter to Arnauld, May, 1686, (pp. 106-107 in Montgomery)
120. 3_96.
On the scholastic background of Kant's thought see Ermano Bencivenga, Kant's Copernican Revolution, (Oxford University Press: New York, Oxford, 1987), chapter 2.
121. 3_97.
I&I, pp. 246-247.
122. 3_98.
Ibidem, p. 248.
123. 3_99.
Ibidem, p. 248.
124. 3_100.
Ibidem.
125. 3_101.
Ibidem.
126. 3_102.
Cf. Prologomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. by Carus and Ellington, (Hackett: Indaianapolis, 1977), p. 26.
127. 3_103.
I&I, pp. 260-261.
128. 3_104.
Ibidem, pp. 262-263.
129. 3_105.
Ibidem.
130. 4_1.
Unfortunately we cannot yet handle TeX or LaTeX files. The convertors we've tried have proved useless.
131. 4_2.
At our home site, ftp.csic.es, there is -- hanging from our main directory /pub/sorites -- a subdirectory, WWW, which, among other files, contains one called `HTML.howto', wherein the interested reader can find some useful information on HTML editors and convertors.
132. 4_3.
For the time being, and as a service to our readers and contributors, we have a directory called `soft' hanging from our home directory /pub/sorites at the node ftp.csic.es. The directory contains some of the non-commercial software we are referring to, such as archivers or 8-to-7 encoders (or 7-to-8 decoders).
133. 4_4.
In the case of WordPerfect 5.1, the procedure is as follows. Suppose you have a file called `dilemmas.wp5' in your directory c:\articles, and you want to submit it to SORITES. At your DOS prompt you change to your directory c:\articles. We assume your WordPerfect files are in directory c:\WP51. At the DOS prompt you give the command `\wp51\convert'; when prompted you reply `dilemmas.wp5' as your input file whatever you want as the output file -- suppose your answer is `dilemmas.ker'; when prompted for a kind of conversion you choose 1, then 6. Then you launch you communications program, log into your local host, upload your file c:\articles\dilemmas.ker using any available transmission protocol (such as Kermit, e.g.). And, last, you enter your e_mail service, start an e_mail to to <sorites@ifs.csic.es> and include your just uploaded dilemmas.ker file into the body of the message. (What command serves to that effect depends on the e_mail software available; consult your local host administrators.)
With WordPerfect 6 the conversion to kermit format is simple and straightforward: you only have to save your paper as a `kermit (7 bits transfer)' file.
134. 4_5.
Those devices are temporary only. Later on we'll strongly advise and encourage those of our contributors who can use neither WordPerfect format nor one of the other word-processor formats our convertors can handle automatically to resort to HTML, with certain conventions in order to represent Greek characters as well as logical and set-theoretic symbols.
135. 5_1.
The reader may find an excellent discussion of copyright-related issues in a FAQ paper (available for anonymous FTP from rtfm.mit.edu [18.70.0.209] /pub/usenet/news.answers/law/Copyright-FAQ). The paper is entitled «Frequently Asked Questions about Copyright (V. 1.1.3)», 1994, by Terry Carroll. We have borrowed a number of considerations from that helpful document.